6 August 2008 ~ Continuing deep concern about the siting of the US National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility on the mainland

US Congressman, Brad Miller, is quoted at www.indyweek.com:
".... sober, serious concerns about the facility that DHS (i.e. Department of Homeland Security) has not satisfied.
If democracy means anything, local elected officials speak for the people of their community, and local elected officials in Granville County now oppose bringing the facility to Butner. ...
I continue to believe that we must do the research that would be conducted at the proposed facility to protect public health and our food supply, whether at the current location at Plum Island or elsewhere, and that wherever the research is done it must be done safely."

July 6 2008 ~ "Plum Island is the clear choice for the NBAF, and Homeland Security should opt to build it there."

Many thanks to FMD news for alerting us to a link on the subject of the proposed new high-security $451 million laboratory in the US that is to replace the world famous but ageing laboratory at Plum Island. www.onlineathens.com David Lee, University of Georgia's vice president for research is quoted as saying he favours ".. building the NBAF on Plum Island if that New York location is the safest place for it.
"If DHS believes Plum Island is truly going to be significantly safer, they should choose to build it there. I believe it would only be incrementally safer."
Plum Island is protected by more than a mile of water, and the area is home to few livestock that could catch the dreaded, highly contagious foot-and-mouth disease - facts noted in the Homeland Security report. "It would be irresponsible and basically abuse of trust in the government" to build it elsewhere, he said...." Read in full .

June 23 2008 ~ "if foot-and-mouth does get out, what does that mean to these sites?"

In the US, there are still 5 potential locations for the new high-security $451 million laboratory that is to replace the world famous laboratory at Plum Island. If the lab is built in the middle of land where susceptible animals are grazing, what happens in the event of a leak such as happened at Pirbright in 2007? The sixth option would be, of course, to build the new research lab on Plum Island itself.
According to the Associated Press on the subject of the 1,005-page Homeland Security Department report, it is calculated that
".... economic losses in an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease could surpass $4 billion if the lab were built near livestock herds in Kansas or Texas... That would be nearly $1 billion higher than the government's estimate of losses blamed on a hypothetical outbreak from its existing laboratory on Plum Island, N.Y.....The threat from fire and explosion would be diminished for the government's isolated laboratory on Plum Island "due to the low likelihood of any disease getting off of the island...."

Monday 8 June ~ "... if the lab comes to Kansas it will be surrounded by agricultural production.." says professor at Kansas State

Kansas State University (like Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina and Texas) is still very keen to have the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility, the $451 million lab that is to replace Plum Island. According to www.kansas.com a decision on the site is expected later this year, and the new lab could be operating by 2013. The head of the university's Political Science Department, is quoted: "... There are a few people with qualms about it."
Before it happened in 2007, few had any qualms about a possible virus escape at Pirbright - but the GAO report seems ready to learn the lessons of that traumatic episode - as see below.
". ... there will always be some risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told us that an island location can provide additional protection..."
It seems to many of us incredible, that the US, like the UK, seems unable to let go of the mindset of mass kill in the event of FMD. But a reluctance to use available technology to protect and prevent means that an escape from a mainland lab could, as at Pirbright, be disastrous for the animals and farmers in the vicinity and beyond. (More on FMD vaccination. More on rapid on-site diagnostic technology)

May 27 2008 ~ US Government Accounting Office report warns about what happened at Pirbright

The GAO report "GAO-08-821T High-Containment Biosafety Laboratories", should be read in full ( warmwell's html version here in new window) Its conclusions are particularly relevant to the hazards demonstrated by the Pirbright leak.
"...A recent release from the Pirbright facility - located in a farming community on the mainland of the United Kingdom - highlights the risks of a release from a laboratory that is in close proximity to the susceptible animals....
• ....human error can never be completely eliminated and since a lack of commitment to the proper maintenance of biocontainment facilities and their associated technology - as the Pirbright facility showed - can cause releases...
• ...The investigations determined that there had been a failure to properly maintain the site's infrastructure. In all, eight separate outbreaks occurred over a 2-month period.
• ... ...accidents, while rare, still occur because of human or technical errors. Given the non-zero risk of a release from any biocontainment facility, most of the experts we spoke with told us that an island location can provide additional protection. ...."
The report reveals that the DHS had not conducted any studies to determine the wisdom of moving FMD activities away from Plum Island, using instead an existing study that does not clearly support such a move. The GAO concludes that an island location can help prevent what happened in Surrey: the spread of FMD virus along terrestrial routes (by vehicles splashed with contaminated mud, for example) and also perhaps airborne transmission. The report noted grimly how "recent outbreaks in the United Kingdom have demonstrated its economic consequences."